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1 RISKS IN THE MACROFINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The global economy has slowed in recent quarters, against a background of persistent 
trade tensions. Global GDP grew by 3.6% in 2018, 0.1 pp down on 2017 and below 
expectations at the start of the year. It moved on a slowing path that steepened in the closing 
months of the year (Chart 1.1.A). Economic activity remained more robust in the United 
States, although there have also been signs of some easing in growth recently. In the other 
advanced economies, GDP growth was also below expectations, especially in the euro area. 
Against this background, monetary policy in the main advanced economies is adopting a 
more accommodative stance. Among the emerging economies, the economic indicators in 
China showed signs of deceleration, to which the authorities responded with new stimulus 
measures. There is also less dynamism in other regions, in particular in the more vulnerable 
economies such as Argentina and Turkey. The announced macroeconomic stabilisation 
programmes in both did not succeed in preventing increased tensions in recent weeks. 
In the euro area, the slowdown in economic activity in 2018 was particularly sharp in 
the second half of the year. GDP growth, which stood at 1.8% in 2018, 0.7 pp down on 
2017, slowed sharply in the final stretch of the year. This deceleration ran into early 2019 
(Chart 1.1.B) and has affected most countries, in particular Germany. The downturn is in 
response to a lower contribution by the external sector to growth. Behind this lies the 
weakness, on one hand, of the member countries and, on the other, of products such as 
investment goods and automobiles, which are very important in respect of European 
specialisation. Further factors are the past appreciation of the euro, trade tensions and 
geopolitical uncertainty.1 Some signs suggest that this weakness in external demand has 
already begun to feed through to domestic demand, in particular to investment and to 
employment. 
The outlook for the world economy in 2019 is one of a moderate slowdown, but with 
significant downside risks. The recent sluggishness of the global economy has given rise 
to a downward revision of economic forecasts, in the advanced economies – especially in 
the euro area – and in the emerging countries (Chart 1.1.C). In particular, the persistency of 
the slowdown led to a lowering of the ECB’s forecasts for 2019 and 2020 in March, to 1.1% 
and 1.6%, respectively, 0.6 and 0.1 pp less than forecast in December. Of note in this 
baseline scenario are the risks of more unfavourable than expected developments. These 
relate to the uncertainty of economic policy (trade policy in particular) and to the possibility 
of a sharper than foreseen slowdown in some systemic economies, such as China. The 
Chinese authorities face a dilemma as to whether to stimulate economic activity in the short 
term, containing the slowdown, at the expense of checking the path of correction of China’s 
macrofinancial imbalances and potentially increasing the risk of a sharper adjustment in the 
future. Given China’s growing weight in the world economy, a sharper than expected 
slowdown in this country might entail significant global consequences, through the trade, 
financial and confidence channels, and through the commodities markets (Chart 1.1.D). For 
the euro area, another major cause for concern is that the recession in Italy may ultimately 
worsen its fiscal position and Italian banks’ balance sheets. Additionally, there is a very 
substantial risk of a possible disorderly no-deal Brexit.2 
1  For further details see Box 2,“The impact of the slowdown in world trade on euro area exports”, Quarterly report 
on the Spanish economy, Economic Bulletin 1/2019, Banco de España.
2  For further details see “Brexit: current situation and outlook”, Documento Ocasional No. 1905 (March 2019), 
Banco de España.
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The risks in the emerging economies of most importance for Spain are also significant. 
In Brazil, the new government has unveiled its proposal for Social Security reform. It has 
been favourably received by the markets, but faces a long and arduous process before 
approval. There is thus a risk that public debt will continue increasing notably in the coming 
years. In Mexico, there is concern too on the fiscal front, owing to the situation of the state-
owned oil company PEMEX, and to the downward revision of the growth outlook for the 
economy. This has led several rating agencies to place the outlook for Mexican public debt 
in negative territory. Moreover, uncertainty persists over the performance of the external 
sector, since the USMCA treaty that is to replace NAFTA has still to be approved in the US, 
Mexican and Canadian legislative branches. Lastly, Argentina and Turkey continue their 
slow process of adjustment, with risks both in the external environment, essentially 
associated with the possible appreciation of the dollar, and on the domestic front. In 
particular, in Turkey, there is a risk that the recently implemented monetary and fiscal 
policies will be eased. And in Argentina, the presidential elections scheduled for late 2019 
The world economy is continuing to slow down, against a backdrop of significant risks to growth and downward revisions of economic forecasts. The 
increase in protectionist tensions, the possibility of a disorderly no-deal Brexit, an adjustment in financial markets or a sharper deceleration of the Chinese 
economy could have a severe impact on global activity.
SYSTEMIC COUNTRIES OF MATERIAL IMPORTANCE CHART 1.1
6.0
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Jan-18 Mar-18 May-18 Jul-18 Sep-18 Nov-18 Jan-19 Mar-19
C  CONSENSUS FORECASTS FOR 2019
% y-o-y % y-o-y
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
A  CONTRIBUTIONS TO GLOBAL GDP CHANGE
pp
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
USA Euro
area
RU JPN ARG BRA CHL MEX IND IDN KOR VNM
D  GLOBAL IMPACT OF A DECELERATION IN CHINA (a)
%
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
81027102
B  CONTRIBUTIONS TO QUARTER-ON-QUARTER GDP CHANGE 
OF THE EURO AREA
%
SOURCES: IMF, Eurostat, Consensus, IFS.
a Simulations using NiGEM. Impact on GDP growth in year one of a fall of 1 pp in potential growth and in domestic demand in China, which entails a decline of 7% in 
oil prices, of 8% in metal prices and adverse effects on global financial markets (correction of 10% in the stock markets of China, Europe, Japan and USA; increase 
of 50 bp in share risk premium; and increase of 60 bp in long-term interest rates of emerging economies).
DEVELOPED LATAM (EXCL. VENEZUELA)
EMERGING ASIA EMERGING EUROPE
OTHER EMERGING ECONOMIES GLOBAL
DOMESTIC DEMAND EXTERNAL DEMAND GDP
USA JAPAN UNITED KINGDOM
EURO AREA CHINA (right-hand scale)
FINANCIAL CHANNEL COMMODITY PRICES CHANNEL
REAL CHANNEL COMBINED SHOCK
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, SPRINg 2019
might raise doubts over the country’s future economic policy stance and prompt fresh 
turbulence on the markets that will hamper the macroeconomic adjustment. 
In the final stretch of 2018, the Spanish economy retained its expansionary inertia, 
which is estimated to have run into the opening months of 2019. On Banco de España 
estimates, GDP is expected to have increased by 0.6% in quarter-on-quarter terms in 
2019 Q1 (Chart 1.2.A), and by 2.4% year-on-year. As in 2018, this dynamism was mainly 
underpinned by robust domestic demand, while exports slowed significantly, reflecting the 
downturn in the external environment (Chart 1.2.B). Employment continued to increase in 
step with the growth in activity. This was conducive to a fresh decline in the unemployment 
rate, although it is also moving on a slowing path. 
The short and medium-term outlook is for a continuation of growth, albeit at somewhat 
lower rates and with downside risks. The Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic 
projections, published in March, envisage the continuation of the expansionary phase over 
the 2019-2021 period, but with GDP gradually slowing (Chart 1.2.A).3 Conditioning this 
baseline scenario are domestic as well as external risks. Should these materialise, they 
might translate into a more unfavourable course of economic activity. The risks include 
most notably those associated with the still-indefinite short and medium-term fiscal policy 
path and, generally, the future economic policy stance. 
The closing months of 2018 saw an increase in investor risk aversion on global 
financial markets. As a result of this, there were across-the-board declines in share prices 
and increases in credit risk premia (Charts 1.3.A and 1.3.B), rises in volatility and cuts in the 
yields on top-quality long-term sovereign debt, which acted as a safe haven (Chart 1.3.C). 
Several factors prompted these developments: the publication of macroeconomic indicators 
which on the whole disappointed market expectations; the pessimism surrounding US/
China trade negotiations; and a US Federal Reserve monetary policy that was less 
accommodative than expected by the market. 
3  For further details see Box 1, “Macroeconomic projections for Spain” Quarterly report on the Spanish economy, 
Economic Bulletin 1/2019, Banco de España.
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1.2.1 FINANCIAL MARKETS
The upturn over the period 2019-2021 is projected to continue, albeit with a gradually slowing profile and downside risks. The buoyancy of GDP is 
estimated to have been underpinned by robust domestic demand, whereas exports are estimated to have slowed significantly.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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Following the bout of instability on global financial markets at end-2018, market indicators have recovered notably in the opening months of 2019 
coinciding with the more accommodative stance of the main central banks, among other factors. The financial conditions in the main economies have 
tightened compared with the situation at the cut-off date of the previous FSR, but they remain lax, as suggested by the stock market rally, the fall in 
sovereign debt yields, lower corporate spreads and the relative stability of the dollar.
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Since the start of the year, the recovery on the financial markets has generally been 
notable. Global growth forecasts were admittedly revised downwards. But the more 
accommodative stance adopted by the US Federal Reserve in the final weeks of 2018 has 
meant that markets are currently not discounting any rise in benchmark interest rates in the 
US economy in 2019. Indeed, markets even anticipate a possible cut. That, together with 
greater optimism over the possibility of a US/China trade agreement, has prompted across-
the-board stock market gains and the appreciation of other risky assets in early 2019. The 
measures implemented by China to counter the slowdown in its economy and some 
positive surprises in US corporate results also contributed to this pick-up on the markets. 
The ECB has also adopted a more accommodative monetary policy stance. In March, 
the ECB Governing Council extended the minimum time horizon over which it expects to 
maintain its policy interest rates at their current levels (“at least until the end of 2019”). That 
prompted a further delay in market expectations about the date of the first rate rise in the 
region.4 The Governing Council also agreed to launch a series of quarterly targeted long-
term refinancing operations (TLTRO-III) commencing September 2019, with the intention 
of maintaining favourable financing conditions and fluid monetary policy transmission. 
Against this backdrop, bank and several sovereign debt risk premia have fallen on 
euro area financial markets in 2019 to date. And, at the same time, stock market 
prices have partly recouped the losses in the final stretch of 2018. In Spain and 
Portugal, the risk premium on long-term sovereign debt vis-à-vis Germany has fallen by 
around 10 bp and 30 bp, respectively, since the start of the year. In Italy, after reaching a 
budgetary agreement with the European Commission and despite the fact the economy 
has gone into technical recession, this spread – which was highly volatile in late 2018 – has 
held relatively stable in 2019. Currently, it stands around 60 bp below its autumn peak 
(Chart 1.3.D). European banks’ risk premia also fell. Euro area and Spanish bank share 
prices have recovered since the start of the year, though to a lesser extent than those of 
US banks. They have also shown greater sensitivity to unfavourable news, as could be 
seen in February following the release of 2018 results (Chart 1.3.E). In any event, the 
EuroStoxx banks index on European bourses and on the Madrid Stock Exchange stand 
over 20% below their levels at the onset of 2018. 
Overall, financial conditions in the main world economies have tightened somewhat 
compared with the cut-off date for the previous FSR, but they remain easy. Since 
early 2019, the stock market pick-up, the decline in sovereign debt yields and the 
relative stability of the US dollar, following its continued strengthening over much of 
2018 (Chart 1.3.F), have contributed to easing global financial conditions. These 
conditions remain easy in historical terms, despite tightening during the final stretch of 
2018 (Chart 1.3.G). 
The materialisation of some of the risks to global economic growth indicated in the 
previous section might trigger a correction in financial asset prices. This possible 
correction might primarily affect those markets showing greater vulnerabilities (cases in 
point being the leveraged loans and CLOs markets) or higher valuations, such as the US 
stock market (Chart 1.3.H) and the high-yield corporate debt segment (Chart 1.3.B). From 
this perspective, it cannot be ruled out that this potential realignment of prices might lead 
to accelerated asset sell-offs, with potentially disruptive effects on markets.
4  For further details see Box 4, “Market expectations about the euro area benchmark interest rate” Quarterly report 
on the Spanish economy, Economic Bulletin 1/2019, Banco de España.
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This potential correction of financial asset prices would adversely affect financial 
stability in Spain through various channels. First, it would entail a tightening of financing 
conditions across various sectors, whose effect on the Spanish economy would be 
significant given its high external indebtedness. Further, the loss of value of assets might 
unfavourably affect financial intermediaries through two channels: directly, by affecting 
the market value of the traded assets held in their portfolios; and indirectly, by reducing 
household and corporate wealth, which would adjust their spending and investment 
decisions downwards, thereby amplifying the recent downturn in the macroeconomic 
environment and impairing the credit quality of banks’ loan portfolios. 
The real estate market has prolonged the recovery it embarked upon in 2014. The 
recent buoyancy of this market would, inter alia, be a reflection of favourable labour 
market developments and of highly favourable borrowing conditions for house purchases 
by households. Since 2013, there has been a slow but progressive absorption of the 
housing overhang that built up after the crisis (to below 500,000 units at present). A 
further consequence has been relatively high growth rates in house prices (6.6% year-
on-year in 2018 Q4). Overall, average house prices have grown 22% in real terms from 
their trough in early 2014. That said, they remain 31% below their 2007 Q3 peak (Chart 
1.4.A).5 The indicators and models available, based on aggregate data and subject to 
high uncertainty, do not show generalised signs of overvaluation. Yet, as can be seen in 
Chart 1.4.B, some indicators suggest that house prices are now, on average, very close 
to their long-term equilibrium value, after having stood significantly below this level 
during the previous years. 
Despite the sector’s buoyancy, the levels of the main indicators of real estate 
activity are lower than those observed in the years in the run-up to the crisis. For 
example, the volume of housing transactions stood above 550,000 in 2018, marking a 
significant recovery from its floor. That said, this remains far below the 885,000 
transactions recorded on average in the 2004-2007 period (Chart 1.4.C). The current 
supply of new housing, proxied by the number of building permits, accounted last year 
for little more than 10% of the pre-crisis peak. The diminished dynamism of supply in the 
current cycle compared with the previous expansion would be due, among other factors, 
to banks applying a more prudent lending policy to the construction and real estate 
development sector, to the existence of a high stock of unsold houses and to much 
more moderate growth in new household formation (95,000 in 2018, compared with an 
annual average increase of 435,000 in the 2004-2007 period). It is worth highlighting 
with regard to this latter determinant that, although in the final years of the previous 
expansionary cycle the supply of housing grew more sharply than new household 
formation, in the current cycle the dynamics of the two series are more closely in step 
(Chart 1.4.D). That suggests fundamentals have been more supportive of the recent 
growth in the sector.
This recovering trend in real estate market activity and prices shows high 
geographical heterogeneity. While the recovery is practically across the board in Spain, 
there are notable regional disparities, in terms both of transactions and prices. The 
biggest increases have been in the major cities and in coastal areas. There, activity 
is more dynamic, and the thrust of foreign demand is greater and the population more 
concentrated. 
5  For further details on the real estate sector in Spain, see the Banco de España Analytical Article “Recent housing 
market developments in Spain”, by P. Alves and A. Urtasun (May 2019).
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As with purchase prices, rental income has also increased significantly in the recent 
period and shown high geographical heterogeneity.6 The momentum of rental income 
has been against a background of rising demand for this service, which is particularly marked 
in the youngest population segment.7 The greater propensity to rent might be due to various 
factors. These include the impact of the crisis on this segment, changes in preferences 
linked to sociological factors and the adoption of measures that have brought the tax 
treatment of rental and owner-occupancy housing onto a more equal footing and have 
promoted the supply of rental housing, although some of these have recently been reversed. 
6  On information from the Idealista real estate portal.
7  See the Banco de España Analytical Article ”Evolución reciente del mercado del alquiler en España”, by L. Matea 
and D. López (April 2019).
SOURCES: ECB, Eurostat, INE and Ministerio de Fomento.
a Latest observation: 2018 Q4 (house prices), December (housing approvals) and 2018 Q4 (house purchases). Real house prices are deflated using the consumer 
price index.
b The five indicators include three gaps calculated as the difference between the value of the interest variable in each period and its long-term trend for: (i) house 
prices in real terms, (ii) the house prices-to-household-disposable-income ratio and (iii) the house prices-to-rent ratio. Two additional imbalance indicators are 
included for the house price variable in real terms based on econometric models. The first, which is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), compares 
this variable with long-term trend estimations of household disposable income and mortgage interest rates. A second model, an Error Correction Model (ECM) 
compares this variable and the long-term equilibrium relationship between household disposable income, mortgage interest rates and fiscal effects. In all cases, 
long term trends are obtained using a one-tailed Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 400,000.
Real estate market indicators have continued to pick up, although their levels are lower than in the years immediately prior to the crisis. Supply is less 
buoyant than in the previous upturn, reflecting a more prudent lending policy, an overhang of unsold housing and much more moderate growth in new 
household formation.
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It appears necessary here to have a homogenous indicator of new rental prices. 
Renting as a means of covering the demand for residential services is gaining weight in 
Spanish society, and the information available is not as rich as that for owner-occupied 
housing. In particular, rental prices can provide key information for the analysis of financial 
stability. First, they can act as leading indicators of pressures in the demand or supply of 
residential services that may potentially feed through ultimately to house prices. Further, 
renting is one of the components of the return on housing, meaning it can be useful for 
determining the equilibrium level of house prices. Yet to date there is no official statistic on 
new rental prices for the Spanish economy as a whole and for its different regions and 
cities that can be used to this end. 
Despite the growing dynamism observed in the sector, the contracting path of the 
outstanding balance of bank lending to development and construction activities has 
continued in recent months. The total outstanding balance of bank lending to construction 
and development companies declined by 18.6% in 2018, somewhat up on the previous 
year. This was essentially due to the high volume of repayments and to the sale of loan 
portfolios by credit institutions (Chart 1.5.A). In any event, these aggregate data mask high 
heterogeneity. In particular, Chart 1.5.B reveals that some institutions’ credit exposure to 
the sector increased last year. 
Conversely, mortgage financing to households has been more dynamic. New 
mortgage loans for house purchase increased by 17.1% in 2018, firming the recovery 
initiated some years back. Although the generation of new lending business is still far 
off the pre-crisis levels, it is already almost sufficient to offset the repayment of outstanding 
mortgage debt. As a result, the outstanding balance of household mortgages practically 
stabilised, following the successive fall-offs observed since the start of the crisis 
(Chart 1.5.C).
It is estimated that the conditions of access to mortgage lending8 have tended to 
ease in recent years but, after the tightening observed during the crisis, current 
conditions are stricter than they were before 2008. The proportion of high-risk mortgages, 
measured as those with an LTV (loan-to-value) ratio of over 80%, has held relatively stable 
over the past 14 years (Chart 1.6.A). But other indicators point to stricter lending conditions 
now than prior to 2008.9 This is the case of the LTP (loan-to-price) ratio, which shows a 
notable loss of weight of mortgage loans with a ratio above 80% (Chart 1.6.B), but also of 
the LTI (loan-to-borrower’s income) ratio (Chart 1.6.C) and of the ratio of loan service 
(interest plus principal) to borrower’s income (LSTI, Chart 1.6.D), whose distributions have 
shifted towards lower values. In recent years, there has also been a loss of weight in 
8  The indicators used to analyse lending standards in mortgages are as follows: (i) Loan-to-Value (LTV): ratio of the 
mortgage loan capital to the property rated value; (ii) Loan-to-Price (LTP): ratio of the mortgage loan capital to 
the property transaction price in the property registry; (iii) Loan-to-Income (LTI): ratio of the mortgage loan capital 
to the borrower’s annual income; (iv) Loan Service-to-Income (LSTI): ratio of the first mortgage loan instalment 
(annualised) to the borrower’s annual income; (v) Term: maturity of the operation; and (vi) Interest rate spread: 
spread between the mortgage interest rate and that of a benchmark interest rate. For greater details on the 
construction of the LTV and LTP ratios and the changes therein, see the Analytical Article “The loan-to-value ratio 
for housing in Spain over the period 2004-2016”. Economic Bulletin 1/2019, Banco de España.
9  The information used in the panels of Chart 1.6 is from the Spanish Colegio de Registradores (Association of 
Registrars), supplemented with data from the European DataWarehouse (EDW), on the characteristics of 
securitised loans. The Spanish Association of Registrars provides itemised mortgage loan information on all 
operations recorded in Spanish property registries. The EDW, for its part, is a repository of bank securitisations, 
which compiles data on each mortgage loan backing the issuance of these instruments. While the 
representativeness of this database is much less than that of the Association of Registrars, particularly for after 
the crisis, the EDW allows a granular (credit by credit) analysis of certain mortgage characteristics, such as the 
income of borrowers, which is lacking in the Association of Registrars data. 
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mortgages at over 30 years (Chart 1.6.E). Although these interest rates spreads and the 
dispersion thereof across mortgages have recently narrowed (Chart 1.6.F), these indicators 
reveal more demanding lending conditions than those observed at the end of the last 
expansionary cycle. Specifically, the greater dispersion of interest-rate spreads across 
mortgages compared with the 2006 lows suggests that in the recent period there may have 
been greater discrimination among operations, whereby those perceived as riskier would 
pay a comparatively higher premium than less risky operations.
The new real estate credit agreements law, which will come into force in June, should 
be conducive to a decline in the current litigiousness in this market. The result should 
improve market functioning, though it might give rise to some tightening of the 
conditions applied. The entry into force of the new mortgage lending law will increase the 
legal security of these agreements, while strengthening their transparency and customer 
safeguards. Moreover, the introduction of stricter requirements for assessing borrower 
solvency should contribute to reducing credit risk in mortgage operations. From the 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The panels refer to the oustanding credit in the construction (including development) and real estate activities sector.
b The panel shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year rates of change in credit in 2018, weighted by the credit corresponding 
to each deposit institution. This density function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, 
yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
c New lending volumes in 2014 relate to the twelve-month period from April 2014 to March 2015, since the 2014 data are not available from January. Total credit in 
2014 is taken as the March 2015 figure to make it consistent with the new lending volumes.
Outstanding credit to developers and builders fell sharply, although developments in credit to this sector are highly heterogeneous. New mortgage loans 
to households have been growing at a sustained rate. The outstanding amount of this type of credit is beginning to stabilise.
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The proportion of loans with a high LTV (of more than 80%) remained stable. As for the LTP ratio, the weight of loans with a ratio of between 80% and 
100% has increased (to the detriment of the weight of the segments above and below these values). The ratios which assess the ability to repay 
mortgages (the LTI and LSTI ratios) are estimated to be far off their pre-crisis levels (an improvement in credit standards). Furthermore, the weight of very 
long-term loans in mortgage financing remains low, whereas the interest rate spreads on mortgages are beginning to stabilise following a narrowing in 
recent years.
SOURCES: Colegio de Registradores and European DataWarehouse.
a Loans with housing as collateral and an individual as the borrower are included. The principal of the loans is accumulated (per period) in the distributions in order 
to define each segment within the distribution. In this chart the following abbreviations are used: LTV (loan to value), LTP (loan to price), LTI (loan to income) and 
LSTI (loan service to income).
b The denominator includes the annual income of the main borrower both in the LTI and the LSTI ratios.
c The mortgage repayment (numerator in the LSTI ratio) or the first monthly payment of the mortgage is annualised. It is calculated assuming that payments are 
constant over the life of the loan.
d Spread of forward interest swap rates. The base curve is that of the euro interest rate swap. The reference period is one year for floating rate mortgages and 
coincides with the maturity of the fixed-rate loans.
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standpoint of borrowers, the new regulations increase their protection, but they might also 
entail some tightening of the conditions applied, especially in the case of the segments 
with a higher risk profile.10
Overall, new lending to the non-financial private sector continued to expand in most 
segments, albeit at lower rates than in the first half of the year. According to the Bank 
Lending Survey, this slowdown might be due both to demand-side and, to a lesser extent, 
supply-side factors. However, after years of easing, these financing conditions remain 
easy. Bank funding and bond-issuing costs remain at historically low levels, without having 
undergone major changes in recent months. 
This fomented the recovery in the net flow of financing extended to households, which 
has turned positive since June 2018, in cumulative 12-month terms, for the first time 
since December 2010 (Chart 1.7.A). Specifically, the financing of this sector showed 
a year-on-year growth rate of 0.4% in February 2019. This increase is due to the dynamism 
of consumer credit which, though it has slowed, continues to grow at double-digit rates, 
offsetting the slight contraction in the stock of financing for house purchase. Box 1.1 analyses 
the factors behind the recent developments in this portfolio, subject to specific monitoring 
by the Banco de España. 
The cyclical upturn continued contributing to strengthening households’ financial 
position. Household gross disposable income notably increased by 3.2% in 2018, boosted 
by the increase in employment and the rise in wages. Net household wealth continued to 
recover, underpinned by the increase in real estate asset prices. Household debt also fell 
as a percentage of GDP (Chart 1.7.C). Specifically, it declined by 2.2 pp on a year earlier 
to 58.9% (scarcely 1.3 pp above the euro area average). Combined with the low cost 
of debt, these developments have led the debt burden to continue falling in recent months, 
albeit very slightly, and to stand at relatively low levels from a historical perspective. 
However, the household saving rate is at a historical low. Despite the increase in 
gross household income, the marked growth in household consumption in recent years 
has prompted a persistent decline in the saving rate to 4.9% of gross disposable income 
at end-2018 (compared with the low of 5.8% in 2018 in the previous upturn). Such 
dynamics do not only entail risk as regards the continuity of the robustness observed in 
consumption, but also with respect to the financial resilience of households in the face of 
unexpected shocks. 
Moreover, this aggregate view masks high heterogeneity. The disaggregated 
information available shows high heterogeneity of households’ financial situation. 
In particular, those that are most vulnerable in the population are the low-income segments. 
For these groups, the ratio of debt service (including principal repayment and interest) to 
gross household income is substantially higher than for other households with debt 
(Chart 1.8.A and B). Specifically, the mortgage debt burden stood in 2017 (the latest 
available information) at over 50% of income in the decile that includes the lowest incomes, 
whereas it was around 10% in that of the highest incomes. The outstanding balance of 
consumer credit accounted in 2018 for 16% of the annual disposable income of households 
in postcodes in the lowest income distribution quintile, compared with approximately 8% 
in the case of households in higher-income postcodes. 
10  For further details see Box 5 “The law regulating real estate credit agreements”, Economic Bulletin 1/2019, 
Banco de España.
1.3  The non-financial 
sectors 
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SOURCES: Datastream, INE and Banco de España.
a The firms bearing a high degree of financial pressure are those for which the ratio (gross operating profit + financial revenue/ financial costs) is less than one.
b Four-quarter cumulative data.
Lending to the non-financial private sector has continued its recovery and even posted positive growth rates in the second half of 2018. At the same time, 
debt ratios have continued their fall, prompting a fresh strengthening of households' and companies' financial positions. The structural budget deficit has 
not decreased in recent years and, consequently, the subdued decline in the general government debt ratio was due to the cyclical component and GDP 
growth, which represents a significant risk for the Spanish economy should the economic cycle change.
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This box analyses in greater detail some determinants of the behaviour 
of the consumer credit portfolio of Spanish deposit institutions. In 
particular, the size of this portfolio has expanded and the volume of 
NPLs increased since 2015, developments that have been closely 
linked to the expansionary behaviour of the segment of credit for the 
purchase of consumer durables. Specifically, over the last three years, 
consumer credit extended by deposit institutions and specialised 
lending institutions (SLIs) in Spain has grown by some €30 billion, 
increasing from somewhat more than €60 billion in December 2015 to 
almost €90 billion in December 2018 (i.e. growth of more than 40%). 
Credit for the acquisition of consumer durables has been the main 
driver of this growth, with year-on-year growth rates of close to or 
above 20% since late 2016. However, this growth slowed in the 
second half of 2018 (14.8% in December 2018, see Chart A).
As regards the NPLs in this segment, they began to increase in 
2017, reaching growth rates of around 20% by mid-2018, although 
their growth edged down in the second half of the year, to 18.4% in 
December 2018 (see Chart B).
One factor that has contributed to the growth of credit mentioned 
above is the behaviour of SLls. SLIs are a group of institutions that 
are not able to take deposits and that tend to grant credit in specific 
business segments (consumer credit, mortgage credit, cards, 
guarantees, etc.). In December 2018, this group of institutions 
accounted for 4.3% of total credit to the resident private sector. In the 
case of households, SLIs accounted for 5.6% of all credit granted as 
at that date. However, the sectoral composition of the credit granted 
to households by SLIs has been changing in recent years, with the 
proportion of consumer credit rising, to the detriment of credit for 
house purchase. Thus, in December 2018, 67% of the credit 
extended to households by SLIs was for the purpose of acquisition 
of consumer goods. This reflects the contrasting behaviour of the 
credit granted by these institutions for house purchase (with negative 
rates of change in recent years) and for consumption, with year-on-
year growth rates of well above 10% since 2014.
The relationship between the consumption of durable goods and 
disposable income enables us to obtain an indicator of the possible 
existence of restrictions on lending for the consumption of this type of 
goods. This is because one would expect the correlation between 
consumption and disposable income to be lower (higher), the smaller 
(larger) the percentage of restricted agents. Chart C shows the 
estimation for different periods of the parameter associated with 
disposable income in a regression model that relates this variable to 
the aggregate consumption series. The estimates for pre-crisis 
BOX 1.1DETERMINANTS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT PORTFOLIO
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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BOX 1.1DETERMINANTS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT PORTFOLIO (cont’d)
cross-bank heterogeneity. The following explanatory variables were 
considered: the return on assets (ROA), the average interest rate on 
consumer credit, the book solvency ratio, the net interest margin, the 
NPL ratio for the consumer credit portfolio, the institution’s market 
share in total consumer credit and total assets.
With regard to the growth of the stock of consumer credit, this 
appears to be inversely related to the level of rates applied by 
institutions, their ex-ante return on assets and their market share. 
This suggests efforts to secure a greater presence and higher returns 
by expanding the consumer loan portfolio, an objective attained by 
means of lower interest rates (see Chart E).
In addition, as regards the growth of NPLs in the consumer credit 
portfolio, it is striking that those institutions with the highest NPL 
ratios seem to be the ones experiencing the smallest increases in 
NPLs. This suggests that a certain convergence is occurring in the 
average credit quality of consumer credit portfolios and that 
institutions with a lower initial portfolio quality have limited their 
expansion in this segment. The initial return on assets appears to be 
negatively correlated with the growth of NPLs, and also with the 
growth of total consumer credit, while the other explanatory variables 
show no significant effects (see Chart F).
In short, consumer credit continues to grow at double-digit rates, 
although it slowed significantly in the second half of 2018. Supply 
and demand patterns lie behind these developments, in particular 
the desire of institutions with a low market share to increase their 
weight in this segment. On the other hand, highlighting a certain 
fragility in the demand for credit in a very benign macrofinancial 
context, NPLs are rising at double-digit rates and accelerating.
The Banco de España will continue to monitor these developments 
closely. So far, they do not pose a risk to the stability of the Spanish 
financial system as a whole, nor do they require the adoption of 
macroprudential measures, but greater vigilance is needed in relation to 
credit conditions and the most dynamic institutions in this segment 
need to be monitored.
periods indicate that credit restrictions were at very low levels. The 
higher correlation estimated after the start of the crisis suggests that 
these restrictions increased significantly, to reach a peak in 2014. A 
change in trend is observed thereafter, and a reduction – albeit not 
continuous – has dominated in recent years. This suggests that 
greater access to bank credit, in the form of a significant increase in 
consumer credit, has enabled households to smooth their durable 
goods consumption. In addition, the shocks to the supply and demand 
for credit for the purchase of durable goods are analysed using a 
structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR). This model allows us 
to estimate the contemporaneous effects of shocks associated with 
supply and demand on changes in consumer credit and interest rates. 
Chart D shows the historical decomposition of supply and demand 
factors in the growth of credit for the purchase of durable goods 
(in cumulative year-on-year terms) between 2004 and 2018.
This chart shows, for example, how growth in this segment has been 
above 10% year-on-year practically every quarter since the 
beginning of 2015. Before the 2008 crisis, growth in this type of 
credit was associated both with supply and demand factors, 
although supply factors made a larger contribution. When the crisis 
arrived supply factors appear to have been more important in 
explaining the decline in credit during the first stage (2008-2010) and 
the last stage (2013-2014) of the credit contraction period from 2008 
to 2014. By contrast, demand factors were the main determinants of 
the decline during the middle years (2010-2012) of this period. 
Finally, since late 2014 both types of factor have been contributing in 
very similar proportions to the increase in consumer credit for 
durable goods.
An analysis was also performed for consumer credit as a whole, to 
determine which bank characteristics are most closely related to the 
growth of total credit and NPLs. For this purpose, a panel was 
considered – with half-yearly frequency, from June 2015 to June 
2018 (seven periods) – with data on the 30 individual institutions with 
the highest relative weights in the consumer credit portfolio. 
The model estimated includes temporary fixed effects to control 
for the set of systemic factors and individual effects to control for 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a ROA = return on assets, Rate = average interest rate on consumer credit. Net interest income = ratio of interest income to assets, Solvency = accounting solvency 
ratio, NPL ratio = NPL ratio for the consumer portfolio, Market share = market share of the institution in total consumer credit , Assets = total assets in the balance 
sheet, Assets (squared) = total assets in the balance sheet, squared. Statistically significant effects set at 5% are shown in red. For each explanatory variable, the 
panel data analysis shows the related regression coefficients.
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Net flows of overall financing of non-financial corporations have also held at positive 
levels since October, in cumulative 12-month terms (Chart 1.7.B). In February 2019, 
this sector’s financial debt was growing at a year-on-year rate of 1.7%. Behind this 
aggregate performance are two very differentiated dynamics. On one hand, the loans 
by non-residents to non-financial corporations and the outstanding balance of fixed-
income issues by these corporations have expanded in year-on-year terms in recent 
months, with the latter variable showing marked dynamism. On the other, the outstanding 
balance of credit provided to these corporations by resident credit institutions has 
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Hacienda and Banco de España.
a The value of the ratio for the percentile range of the income distribution of the population indicated is shown on the x-axis for each date. Panel A was obtained 
from the Living Conditions Survey and Panel B by using information on post codes from the Central Credit Register and on personal income tax from the Ministry 
of Finance.
The breakdown of the available information shows that the financial position of households is highly heterogeneous. In particular, the most vulnerable 
segments of the population are those with the lowest income. The household debt (including repayments and interest) to income ratio is substantially 
higher for these segments than for other indebted households.
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an increase in productivity from the first period analysed.
Available empirical evidence suggests that, after the crisis, banks discriminated between firms to a greater degree based on their credit quality and 
productivity levels when extending new loans. This should contribute to containing the rise in NPLs in future.
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continued shrinking in year-on-year terms, with the rate of decline in recent months having 
increased. In any event, if the real estate and construction sectors are excluded, the 
decline is much more moderate. Moreover, the empirical evidence available suggests that, 
post-crisis, banks have discriminated to a greater extent among companies on the basis 
of their creditworthiness and their productivity (Chart 1.9.A and B) when assigning new 
credit flows. That should contribute to containing the increase in non-performing loans in 
the future. In this respect, Box 1.2 reviews the overall trend in financing to highly indebted 
companies, placing Spain’s situation in this context.  
The economic and financial position of the non-financial corporations sector has 
also continued strengthening. The debt-to-GDP ratio fell in 2018 by 3.5 pp to 74.5%, 
standing 3.4 pp below the euro area average (Chart 1.7.B). This, combined with the low 
cost of debt, has led this sector’s debt burden to continue declining in recent months to 
historically low levels. According to the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office, non-financial corporations’ ordinary profits increased by 5% in 2018, raising the 
return on equity by 0.8 pp in relation to the previous year. However, this aggregate view 
also masks high heterogeneity, meaning that there are still some vulnerably positioned 
segments concentrated in the group of smaller enterprises and, above all, in those 
operating in the real estate and construction sector (Chart 1.7.D).
Public-sector financing conditions have continued to be very favourable. Indeed, the 
interest rates on sovereign debt, which is the main source of financing for this sector, have 
held at historically low levels in recent months. They have even proved relatively insensitive 
to the political and fiscal uncertainty in Italy, which notably raised Italian sovereign debt 
issuing costs in the second half of 2018. That has allowed this sector to continue meeting 
its need for funds through long-term fixed-income securities, reducing its debtor positions 
in the form of short-term bonds and loans (Chart 1.7.E), and thereby raising the average 
life of outstanding debt and cutting back refinancing needs in the near future. 
In any event, the high level of the ratio of public debt to GDP is a source of vulnerability 
for the Spanish economy. This ratio dipped to 97.1% of GDP in 2018, 1 pp down on 
2017, but still 12 pp above the euro area average (Chart 1.7.F). Behind this decline is the 
increase in nominal output and the progressive reduction in the budget deficit. In particular, 
the general government budgetary imbalance fell by 0.6 pp in 2018 to 2.5% of GDP. This 
was, however, thanks to its cyclical component, as no improvement has been seen in its 
structural component since 2013. High public debt is a major factor of vulnerability for the 
Spanish economy ahead of potential rises in the cost of financing (although the lengthy 
maturities of public debt reduce refinancing risk) and of more adverse than expected 
developments in economic activity.
The Spanish economy’s high negative net international investment position (IIP) is 
also a factor of vulnerability ahead of potential turbulence on international financial 
markets. Admittedly, the nation’s negative net IIP has fallen by almost 21 pp of GDP since 
2014. But it still stood at 77.1% of GDP in late 2018, a high level in historical terms and 
relative to other countries. That gives rise to a potentially significant degree of vulnerability 
ahead of any worsening in international capital markets (see Box 1.3). 
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issues are broken down by controlling parent company 
nationality (see Charts C and D), the United Kingdom comes out 
top both in 2017 (€131 billion) and 2018 (€74 billion), although in 
2018 with a considerably narrower margin over the second-
placed country (Germany, with €53 billion). The leveraged loan 
issuance volume of corporations whose parent group is based 
in Spain is much smaller (€26 billion in 2017 and less than €10 
billion in 2018) and behind that of other countries (see Chart C). 
In all the countries considered there is a high percentage of loan 
issues in which significant banks (identified as participants 
in the EBA’s transparency exercise for each country in the study) 
that share the same country of residence as the borrowers’ 
parent companies participate. This figure is over 70% in both 
years in France, Spain and Italy, which is the country with the 
highest rate of national participation.4
BOX 1.2LEVERAgED LOANS TO CORPORATES
Growth in leveraged loan issues1 and in issues of securitisation 
instruments using leveraged loans as their underlying asset, 
especially Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs), and the 
possible easing of credit standards associated with these 
instruments, have been identified by various regulators2 as 
significant risk factors for the stability of both the European and 
the US financial systems. Chart A shows that the overall volume 
of leveraged loan issues has indeed been very significant in 
recent years, with record issuance in 2017 of over €220 billion 
in Europe and over €1.36 trillion in the United States and with 
just a slight moderation in these volumes in 2018 (on average, 
US issuance amounts to six times European issuance throughout 
the period 201318). The aggregated data also show the declining 
significance, both in the United States and Europe, of high-yield 
(below investment grade) bond issues compared with leveraged 
loans provided directly by the banking sector to fund 
corporations with the most highly leveraged financial structures. 
CLO issuance in Europe tripled between 2013 and 2018, while in 
the United States it rose by around 60%. However, in each of 
those years, the volume of issuance remained much higher in the 
United States than in Europe (see Chart B). In any event, CLO 
issuance3 is growing against a backdrop of broader recovery in the 
securitisation market; in fact, towards the end of the period 
indicated, CLOs declined as a proportion of the total volume of 
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), which is a broader 
category of which CLOs are a fraction.
Beyond identifying these overall patterns, this Box aims to 
provide an in-depth analysis of leveraged loan issuance in 
Europe and of Spanish banks’ exposure to leveraged non-
financial corporations. If European corporations’ leveraged loan 
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters, Dealogic, SIFMA-AFME, SIFMA, Datastream and Thomson Reuters Leveraged Loan Monthly - March 2018 and Year End 2018, 
Reuters Bond News November 2018.
a Leveraged loans are syndicated loans classified as leveraged or highly leveraged loans by Thomson Reuters based on a list of credit quality criteria. High-yield 
bonds are bonds classified as lower than investment grade in the Dealogic issuance database. The European issues relate to debtors the nationalities of whose 
parents are the major European economies (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain). Issuance data from Thomson Reuters shown in dollars are 
converted to euros using the euro/dollar exchange rate at the issuance date. 
b SIFMA data on issuance of CDO and CLO securitisations, as well as Thomson Reuters' data on CLO issuance in the United States reported in dollars are converted 
each year at the related average euro/dollar rate. European CLO issuance data for 2018 relate to the January-November period.
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Chart A
ISSUANCE OF LEVERAGED LOANS AND HIGH-YIELD BONDS (a)
€bn %
1  There is no single definition of a leveraged loan; a debt instrument may 
be classified as such according to its rating or risk premium or according 
to accounting measures, such as a debt-to-EBITDA ratio over 6.
2  In its May 2018 Financial Stability Review, Box 5: Leveraged loans: a 
fast-growing high-yield market (pp 74 78), the ECB identified these 
developments as potential financial stability risks. The Federal 
Reserve, in its November 2018 Financial Stability Report, also identified 
an increase in 2017-18 in risky debt issuance (leveraged loans 
and speculative grade bonds) by non-financial corporations (pp 19 20) 
and in CLO issuance (pp 28 29), and noted the high tolerance for 
risk-taking with respect to non-financial corporations’ debt as a 
vulnerability factor.
3  Leveraged loans are not the only possible underlying asset in CLOs, but 
they are the best proxy for the volume of securitisations linked to these 
loans.
4  On the data available, it is only possible to identify the participation of 
national banks in syndicated loans marked as leveraged loans on 
Thomson Reuters, but not the amount of risk assumed.
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syndicated loans to non-financial corporations saw no significant 
change in the period 201218, but there are notable differences 
between one country and another. Cumulative growth in these 
syndicated loans in the period 201218 was approximately 16% in 
Germany and 30% in France, clearly expanding since 2014 and 
2016, respectively. By contrast, both Spain and Italy saw cumulative 
declines of around 22%. 
In 2018, exposure to syndicated loans at the European level (EU 
average) amounted to approximately 13.2% of total credit 
exposure to non-financial corporations, 1.3 pp more than in 2012 
(see Chart F). This ratio has evolved quite differently from one 
Analysis of the total stock of outstanding leveraged loans at 
December 2017 and 2018 (see Chart D) offers similar conclusions 
to the flow analysis. Once again the United Kingdom is the most 
frequent country of residence for groups issuing leveraged loans 
(with €441 billion in 2018), significantly ahead of the second-placed 
country (France, with €158 billion in 2018). Considering total 
issuance, issues corresponding to Spanish borrowers are higher 
than issues corresponding to Italian borrowers (€83.3 billion 
compared with €53.3 billion in 2018). 
Leveraged loans are generally classified as a subsegment of the 
broader market for syndicated bank loans, which do not only 
include loans extended to highly leveraged corporations.5 In any 
event, European banks’ exposure to syndicated loans (see Chart E) 
is another useful proxy for exposure to leveraged loans, as it 
represents a maximum level. Euro area banks’ exposure to 
SOURCE: Thomson Reuters.
a The chart relating to issuance flow considers loans arranged in 2017 and 2018. The stock of issues in a given year considers all issues with arrangement dates 
until December of that year and loan maturity dates after December of that year, i.e., the balance of issues outstanding is considered. Percentages in 2017 and 
2018 indicate the proportion of issues linked to borrowers in a country in which banks of that country intervene (significant institutions participating in the latest 
EBA's transparency exercise) in their capacity as TIer 1 agents of the bank syndicate providing the loan. The borrower's country is identified with the country of 
residence of its latest parent company.
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STOCK OF LEVERAGED LOAN ISSUANCE BY COUNTRY OF BORROWER (a)
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5  Thomson Reuters includes, in its list of leveraged loans, syndicated 
bank loans that are classed as leveraged or highly leveraged based on a 
list of credit quality criteria.
BOX 1.2LEVERAgED LOANS TO CORPORATES (cont’d)
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country to another. In the case of Germany, Italy and France, a 
Ushaped pattern is observed, returning in 2018 to the 2012 level 
in the case of Germany and Italy and continuing to rise moderately 
in the case of France. By contrast, in the case of Spain the ratio is 
clearly climbing: as a percentage of total loans to non-financial 
corporations, syndicated loans rose from 11.9% in 2012 to 17.1% 
in 2018. This, together with the drop in absolute terms in 
syndicated loans granted by Spanish banks observed in Chart E 
indicates that the decline in volume in these loans has been less 
than the decline in volume in overall lending to non-financial 
corporations.
Although not all syndicated loans are granted to highly leveraged 
corporations, Chart G shows that in December 2018 the distribution 
of the debt ratio (total short and long-term debt to total assets) by 
volume of syndicated loans at Spanish deposit-taking institutions 
is concentrated at relatively high levels of the ratio. 
The fact that the leveraged loan and associated securitisation 
business is concentrated in the United States and, within Europe, 
in the United Kingdom, does not mean that the proliferation of 
these instruments poses no risk to the Spanish financial system. 
The risks assumed through leveraged loans in Europe and the 
United States affect global sensitivity to possible shocks to the 
review of the required risk premia or corporations’ financial 
position, and shocks originating in other systems may be passed 
through commercial and financial channels.
In addition, as shown in Chart F, as a proportion of total 
credit exposure to non-financial corporations, Spanish banks are 
not less exposed to syndicated loans than their European peers. 
Lastly, Spanish deposit-taking institutions’ exposure to leverage at 
large corporations is analysed, beyond the syndicated loan 
segment which, despite being an important risk category, might 
not include all exposures to highly leveraged corporations. 
Since 2009, data matching by the Banco de España’s Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO) and its Central Credit 
Register (CCR) shows lower credit exposure to more highly 
leveraged corporations (see Chart H), even though they account 
for a considerable proportion of total credit to large 
corporations in 2018. Specifically, the proportion of credit 
to corporations with debt ratios of 0.6-0.9 and of over 0.9, 
respectively, fell from 51% and 28% in 2009 to 46% and 17% 
in 2018. Exposure to less leveraged corporations mitigates 
the risks to the stability of the system, although the distribution 
of leverage observed indicates that the ability to pay of some 
corporations in this segment could be sensitive to a deterioration 
in macro-financial conditions, were the risks identified in this FSR 
to materialise.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The panel shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the debt ratio (total long- and short-term debt as a percentage of total assets) for firms with 
syndicated loans from Spanish deposit-taking institutions, weighted by the CCR credit amount as at December 2018 for each ratio category. This density 
function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed 
graphic representation of that function. The vertical line indicates the median of the debt ratio measured for the group of large firms in the Central Balance 
Sheet Data Office (CBSO) of the Banco de España at the latest available date.
b The distribution of this panel is obtained by cross-checking the CBSO data, selecting such institutions that individually meet the requirements to be classified 
as a large firm in terms of number of employees, sales or total assets in accordance with Regulation EU 651/2014, with the CCR. CBSO data are used to 
classify the firms based on their debt ratio and CCR data provide the volume of drawndown exposure of Spanish banks to each of these categories. The 
year shown in the panel refers to measurement of the drawndown amount in the CCR (e.g. 2018), with the classification by debt ratio relating to the previous 
December (e.g. 2017).
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BOX 1.3IN ERNATION L INVESTMENT POSITION OF SPAIN 
resident institutional sectors are responsible for them. Chart C 
shows that the increase in the negative net IIP of Spain from 
1999-2009 was due mainly to increased net liabilities in the 
portfolio investment and other investment categories. More 
specifically, in this period the Spanish economy financed its 
growing external imbalances mainly through portfolio investment 
in the form of debt instruments. As became clear upon the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis and the European sovereign 
debt crisis, the finance obtained through these instruments is 
particularly volatile (for example, in comparison with that raised in 
the form of direct investment) and liable to undergo sharp 
adjustments in response to changes in market sentiment. In this 
respect, it should be noted that the weight of these instruments in 
liabilities to the rest of the world has decreased in recent years 
from a high of 37% in 2006 to 28% in 2018. 
Turning to the institutional sector, the breakdown in Chart D 
shows a marked change in the composition of the Spanish IIP. 
Thus, while in 2008 the resident private sector (i.e. other resident 
sectors and other monetary financial institutions) was 
responsible for 83% of Spain’s negative net IIP, at present it only 
accounts for 19% of the total. By contrast, the weight of the 
public sector has increased notably from 22% in 2008 to 58% in 
2018. Meanwhile, the Banco de España has gone from a creditor 
position in 2008 to being responsible for 23% of the current 
debtor position. Since most of the net external liabilities of the 
economy fall on the public sector, it is vital to underpin the 
sustainability of the public finances in order to forestall sharp 
changes in market sentiment and the reversal of external 
financing flows. 
In the years preceding the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, the 
Spanish economy posted persistent and growing current 
account deficits which reached 9.6% of GDP in 2007 and were 
barely offset by the modest capital account surplus (see Chart 
A). This continued recourse to external finance drove the net 
debtor position of the Spanish economy up from 34.7% of GDP 
in 1999 to 80.2% of GDP in 2008,1 a record high at that time and 
well above the levels of other large European economies (see 
Chart B). 
As a result of the crisis the Spanish economy underwent an 
internal process of adjustment of its current account balance 
which has taken it into surplus since 2013. This net lending 
to the rest of the world and the GDP growth reduced (in absolute 
terms) the negative net international investment position (IIP) 
of the Spanish economy by around 21 pp from the high in 2014 
to 77.1% of GDP in 2018. This level, however, continues 
to be high and constitutes a source of vulnerability for the 
Spanish economy in the event of sudden changes in financing 
conditions on the global financial markets. In this respect, some 
studies have attempted to identify risk thresholds in external 
liabilities which, if exceeded, would be indicators of an 
appreciable increase in the vulnerability of the economy to 
international market turbulence. The Banco de España’s analysis 
puts this threshold for the Spanish economy at 70% of GDP, a 
figure which, however, must be interpreted with caution given 
the methodological difficulties entailed in the construction of 
indicators of this type.2 Moreover, the towering external debt of 
the Spanish economy is not amenable to correction in the short 
term, especially if it is taken into account that in the last few 
quarters the current and capital account surpluses have 
decreased and will for the next few years foreseeably hold at 
more moderate levels than those seen between 2014 and 2017. 
To better understand the risks derived from the high debtor 
position of the Spanish economy, it is useful to analyse also which 
financial products are used to incur these debts and which 
1  Changes in the IIP, in addition to being determined by the behaviour of 
the current account, also depend on valuation effects and other 
adjustments. In the period 1999-2008, these items made a negative 
contribution to IIP equivalent to 21 pp.
2  For more details, see Chapter 3 of the 2016 Annual Report of the Banco 
de España.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The net IIP is the difference between the value of the external assets and liabilities of resident sectors vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
b The external debt comprises the balance of all liabilities giving rise to future payments of principal, interest or both (i.e. all financial instruments, except own funds, 
financial derivatives and monetary gold ingots).
c Including only direct investment in the form of debt.
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a The net IIP is the difference between the value of the external assets and liabilities of resident sectors vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
b The external debt comprises the balance of all liabilities giving rise to future payments of principal, interest or both (i.e. all financial instruments, except own funds, 
financial derivatives and monetary gold ingots).
c Including only direct investment in the form of debt.
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Lastly, it is useful to supplement the information furnished by the 
IIP with that provided by gross external debt, an indicator which 
includes only the liabilities to the rest of the world that carry 
payment obligations.3 In particular, this measure excludes all 
external liabilities in the form of holdings in capital, since these do 
not carry any future payment obligation and therefore do not pose 
the same risks to the sustainability and/or refinancing of external 
debt as other financing vehicles such as bonds or loans. Chart E 
shows that the gross external debt of the Spanish economy has 
barely shown signs of improvement in recent years, although it is 
in line with the euro area average. Since its peak in 2015, this 
indicator has only decreased by 2 pp to 166.7% of GDP in 2018. 
However, as regards its composition, there have been some 
changes in recent years which have helped to reduce its 
vulnerability. In particular, as shown by Chart F, the securities 
issued by the public sector, which generally carry lower refinancing 
and liquidity risk than those issued by the private sector, have 
increased their weight in the total gross external debt from 14% in 
2008 to 30% in 2018. The same goes for the external liabilities of 
the Banco de España, closely linked to monetary policy 
implementation, and for certain associated risks even more 
limited than those of the public sector, whose weight in the gross 
external debt increased by 22 pp in the same period. The weight 
of long-term instruments, which likewise usually carry lower 
refinancing risk, has also increased. 
3  External debt comprises all liabilities to non-residents that entail future 
repayment of principal, payment of interest or both. In practice, this 
includes all financial instruments except equity (shares and other equity, 
and investment fund units), financial derivatives and monetary gold 
ingots.

